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Organisms sometimes appear to use extravagant traits, or “handicaps”, to signal their quality to an interested receiver. Before
they were used as signals, many of these traits might have been selected to increase with individual quality for reasons apart
from conveying information, allowing receivers to use the traits as “cues” of quality. However, current theory does not explain
when and why cues of individual quality become exaggerated into costly handicaps. We address this here, using a game-theoretic
model of adaptive signalling. Our model predicts that: (1) signals will honestly reflect signaler quality whenever there is a positive
relationship between individual quality and the signalling trait’s naturally selected, non-informational optimum; and (2) the slope
of this relationship will determine the amount of costly signal exaggeration, with more exaggeration favored when the slope is
more shallow. A shallow slope means that a lower quality male would pay only a small fitness cost to have the same trait value as
a higher quality male, and this drives the exaggeration of signals as high-quality signalers are selected to distinguish themselves.
Our model reveals a simple and potentially widespread mechanism for ensuring signal honesty and predicts a natural continuum
of signalling strategies, from cost-free cues to costly handicaps.
KEY WORDS: Costly signalling theory, cue, extravagance, handicap principle, honest signalling, index, sexual selection, signals.
Impact Summary
Why do some organisms have such bizarre and extravagant
traits like the peacock’s tail? Our current understanding is
that these traits are probably used to signal an individual’s
quality to an interested receiver (e.g., a peacock’s quality to
a peahen). Yet other signals remain small and drab, so it is
not clear when and why natural selection favours highly ex-
aggerated signals. We use a mathematical model to explore
a potential explanation: the idea that most signalling traits
might have started out as naturally selected traits that were
positively related to the quality of the signaler, and this rela-
tionship may have been strong or weak (having a steep slope
∗These authors contributed equally to this work.
or shallow slope, respectively). When the relationship is weak,
it is initially not very costly for low-quality individuals to fake
a high-quality signal. In this case, our model predicts the evo-
lution of highly exaggerated signals, as high-quality signalers
try to distinguish themselves from low-quality ones. In con-
trast, when signaler quality is strongly related to a signalling
trait’s naturally selected optimum, it can be excessively costly
for a low-quality individual to fake a high-quality signal. As
a result, high-quality individuals do not need to try so hard to
distinguish themselves, and so signals do not become exagger-
ated. We conclude that all sorts of signaling traits–from costly,
exaggerated traits like the peacock’s tail to inconspicuous and
effectively cost-free signals–arise from the same general the-
ory. The crucial difference is how the traits started out, before
being used as signals.
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Biological signalling is famous for the extravagance of traits
used to convey information about the signaler’s quality (e.g., as
a mate, an opponent, or a symbiotic partner). A classic exam-
ple is the peacock’s tail because it seems so clearly exaggerated
beyond what could be useful for flight or any other function
beyond attracting mates (Darwin 1871). In such cases, the ex-
travagance of signals may convey honest information about male
quality because low-quality males would not ultimately benefit
from faking an extravagant signal (the handicap principle; Zahavi
1975; Grafen 1990a; Maynard Smith and Harper 2004; Searcy
and Nowicki 2005; Bradbury and Vehrencamp 2011). However,
not all signals are so obviously extravagant, and more recent mod-
els show that the stability of honest signalling need not involve
high costs paid by honest signalers (Hurd 1995; Lachmann et al.
2001; Számadó 2011; Holman 2012). We need a general theory
of biological signalling that can predict when signals will become
exaggerated and when they will not.
The problem of predicting signal exaggeration is particularly
relevant when signals originate from traits that already reflect in-
dividual quality. In the context of sexual selection, Fisher (1930)
suggested that female preferences originate as a response to pre-
existing, naturally selected male traits that were positively cor-
related with male quality. In this case, females could use those
male traits as cues of mate quality (where “cue” refers to a trait
that has not evolved for the purpose of conveying information;
Maynard Smith and Harper 2004). Signalling could then arise
if males co-opt the existing female preference for a particular
male trait, using it to “persuade” females to mate. Most sig-
nals presumably originated in a similar way (sometimes called
“ritualization”, Tinbergen 1952; see also Bergstrom et al. 2002;
Johnstone et al. 2009; Scott-Phillips et al. 2012). However, ex-
isting models of this scenario do not examine when and why
cues become exaggerated into costly signals. One relevant em-
pirical study suggests that the optimal tail length of male barn
swallows, in terms of maximizing aerodynamics, conveys almost
all of the information needed to assess their potential quality as
mates (Bro-Jørgensen et al. 2007). This underscores the basic
question: if signals evolve from traits that already reflect indi-
vidual quality, then when and why do they become exaggerated
at all?
Here, to address this question, we develop a general model
of signal evolution from pre-existing cues of individual quality.
Our approach extends a game-theoretic model of the handicap
principle (Grafen 1990a), by allowing signals to evolve from a
trait whose optimal value increases with individual quality. We
suppose that signallers benefit from using the trait as a signal
of quality (e.g., male birds start using tail length to persuade fe-
males), and our aim is to predict when such signals will require
exaggeration to remain informative. The model reveals a contin-
uum of potential signalling outcomes, including costly handicaps
and low-cost signals that are effectively equivalent to the pre-
existing cue.
Results
Our model is based on the game-theoretic approach of Grafen
(1990a). To ground the model in a concrete biological context,
we frame the signalling problem in terms of sexual selection and
mate choice in animals, where males are the signalers and fe-
males are the receivers. More generally, the model will apply to
analogous contexts, including offspring signalling their need to
parents (Godfray 1991; Wild et al. 2017) and plants signalling
their quality to pollinators or herbivores (Archetti and Brown
2004; Knauer and Schiestl 2015). In our approach, males have a
signalling strategy that matches their quality to a particular sig-
nal size, and females have a strategy that infers signaler quality
from signal size. We seek the joint evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS; Maynard Smith and Price 1973), where no new signaler or
receiver strategies can invade the population. Our model there-
fore examines selection near evolutionary equilibria, and we use
comparisons among predicted equilibria (an approach known as
comparative statics) to gain insight about the origin and main-
tenance of signalling strategies. This approach avoids the extra
complications of a full population genetic model but is expected to
predict the same general features as the full model (see Appendix 5
of Grafen 1990b).
The following sections develop the model in two stages. We
first briefly outline the basic model from Grafen (1990a). We
then add the new assumption that the signalling trait is favoured
to increase with individual quality by natural selection in a non-
signalling context (i.e., the signalling trait originates as a cue).
The key difference between the models is that, in the basic model,
a non-signalling equilibrium means that the signalling trait is lost
altogether; in the extended model, a non-signalling equilibrium
is an optimal trait value that increases with individual quality.
In other words, we start with a positive relationship between
individual quality and a trait’s “non-informational” optimum. We
then ask: given that this relationship exists (and does not change),
how would selection for signalling exaggerate the trait beyond its
non-informational optimum?
BASIC MODEL
We first define the strategy set for males and females in the basic
model. Suppose that males differ in quality, a continuous trait q,
and that a male’s quality affects female fitness if she mates with
him, with higher quality males providing higher female fitness.
Our use of “quality” differs from other uses in animal biology
because the emphasis here is its effect on female fitness, rather
than male fitness—females may often prefer males with higher
fitness, but this need not be the case. We assume that females
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cannot directly observe male quality, but they are able to detect
another male trait, a, which may be correlated with quality. We
will refer to a as the “signalling trait”, while recognizing that the
trait can have a non-signalling function in the absence of signalling
selection. Males express the signalling trait on the basis of their
quality by the function A(q), so that for a given male, a = A(q). The
question for males is: how does the function A evolve, and what
might an equilibrium value be? Females treat a male with signal
level a as though his quality were P(a), so we can think of P as a
rule of inference (in our model, a completely sharp prediction of
the quality of a perfectly perceived male signal). The question for
females is: how does P evolve, and what are possible equilibrium
values? We make the assumptions that q, a, and p are all positive
numbers and that qmin  q  qmax. The probability distribution
function of quality among males is supposed to be G(q), and the
set of points of increase of G is the whole interval [qmin, qmax].
Next, we describe the fitness payoffs associated with male
and female strategies. We suppose that a male’s fitness w is a
function of his signalling trait, his quality as perceived by females,
and his true quality (w = w(a, p, q)). Crucially, male fitness
returns can depend on true quality because higher quality males
might benefit more from being perceived as a given quality or
they might pay a smaller cost for producing a given signal size
(as in our extended model below). A female’s fitness, on the
other hand, depends on how accurately she infers male quality:
underestimation can mean missing out on a high-quality mate,
and overestimation can mean being stuck with a low-quality mate.
We describe these fitness losses by the function D(q, p), which
increases with increasing discrepancy between a male’s actual
quality q and perceived quality p. To find the average loss function
for females, we average over the distribution of male quality
within a population:∫
q
D(q, P(A(q)))dG(q), (1)
where we have assumed that all males follow the rule a = A(q). We
note that there is no explicit cost of female choice in the model;
instead, we simply assume that female choice occurs, implying
that the fitness benefit of choice must outweigh the cost.
We may now repeat the ESS conditions for male signalling
and female preferences given by Grafen (1990a), as follows. If
an equilibrium male strategy A∗(q) and female strategy P∗(a) are
universal, then they are evolutionarily stable if
w(A∗(q), P∗(A∗(q)), q) ≥ w(a, P∗(a), q) for all a, q; (2a)
and∫
q
D(q, P∗(A∗(q)))dG(q) ≤
∫
q
D(q, P(A∗(q)))dG(q) (2b)
for all functions P(a). In simple terms, the male signalling strategy
and female preferences for male signals are stable when there is
no other male or female strategy that yields higher fitness. To
facilitate analysis of the model, we assume sufficient continuity
and differentiability in the functions w and D (likewise for the
function n, introduced below) and measurability of the strategies
A and P.
EXTENDED MODEL: SIGNALS EVOLVE FROM A
PREEXISTING CUE OF QUALITY
To examine the evolution of signals from a preexisting cue of
male quality, we now assume that there is a quality-dependent
optimal level of the signalling trait, owing to natural selection
in a non-signalling context. We represent this non-informational
optimum as the function n(q) and assume for simplicity that the
optimum always increases with male quality. In Appendix I, we
present a general model and a method for finding the signalling
equilibrium without specifying a form for n(q). Here, to illustrate
key predictions from the model, we derive a specific model that
assumes a particular form for the non-informational optimum.
We first need a male fitness function that incorporates pay-
offs from female preferences and allows for a non-informational
optimum that increases with male quality. A simple function for
this scenario supposes that male fitness is given by the following
bell-shaped curve:
w(a, p, q) = exp(λp) · exp
(
−1
2
(
a − n(q)
σ
)2)
. (3)
In this equation, the first term represents the effects of female
assessment, where λ scales the impact of female preference on
male fitness, and the second term represents the effects of the
male’s signalling trait a on his own fitness. Male fitness is reduced
whenever a deviates from the non-informational optimum (a =
n(q)), decreasing on either side of the optimum from a maximum
of exp(λp). This cost for deviating from the optimum is scaled
by σ, where decreasing values of σ result in larger costs. In the
context of male weaponry, for example, a small value for σ could
represent a scenario in which weapons are not free to evolve
exaggeration because they need to retain a biomechanical function
(McCullough et al. 2016). Finally, we suppose that the optimal
non-informational value of a increases linearly with male quality,
such that
n(q) = amin + β(q − qmin), (4)
where β is the slope of the relationship between male quality and
the non-informational optimum.
As an example, the slope (β) could describe the relationship
between tail length and an aerodynamic optimum for bird flight.
The steepness or shallowness of this slope is meaningful only
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Figure 1. The evolution of exaggerated signals from preexisting cues of individual quality. (A) The male’s signalling rule as a function
of male quality, from our specific model in the main text. We set the strength of female preferences to λ = 1; the cost for departing from
the non-informational optimum to σ = 1 or 2 (where lower values imply higher cost); and the slope of the relationship between quality
and the non-informational optimum to β = 1, shown by the straight line. At the lowest quality, the signal takes its non-informational
optimal value. There is immediately an infinite slope, with consistent deceleration toward an asymptote at a distance λσ/β above the
non-informational optimum, with half-life (λσ/β2) ln(2). (B) The level of exaggeration as a function of male quality, for three values of β.
Making the scale-setting assumptions λ = σ = 1, this panel shows how the excess signalling over the non-informational optimum varies
with quality for β = 0.5, 1, 2 (top, middle, and bottom curves, respectively). Increasing β reduces exaggeration, including reducing the
asymptotic value eventually to zero. Decreasing β increases exaggeration, without bound, except for the fixed value of zero at q = qmin.
in relation to the scale of the quality (q) and signalling trait (a)
axes, so in empirical applications these scales would need to be
specified. In order to avoid the choice of measurement units (for
example, mm vs cm to measure tail length) affecting steepness, we
could agree in the model to set λ = σ = 1. Then, steepness would
relate to how much advantage is gained, via female preference for
longer tails as a cue of male quality, relative to how costly the trait
is in terms of moving away from the aerodynamic optimum. Note
that the range of qualities present in males, and its distribution,
does not affect the slope (β).
In Appendix II, we find the ESS (A∗(q), P∗(a)) for our spe-
cific model described by equations (3) and (4). We define the “sig-
nalling gap” as the amount by which the equilibrium male trait
is exaggerated from its non-informational optimum by signalling
selection, and we present an explicit formula for the signalling
costs paid at equilibrium due to this exaggeration. Here, we fo-
cus on two key results about how the parameters of our model
affect the size of the signalling gap, or the extent of costly signal
exaggeration.
Result 1. As long as there is some male fitness benefit of ex-
aggerating the signalling trait beyond the non-informational
optimum (λ > 0, σ > 0), the ESS always involves honest sig-
nalling of male quality (Fig. 1A). Formally, the equilibrium
signalling strategy A∗(q) is positive, and signal size is exag-
gerated beyond the non-informational optimum for all values
of quality above the minimum (qmin). The initial slope of this
signalling gap (i.e., A∗ʹ(qmin)) is infinite, and then the slope
consistently declines with increasing male quality, eventu-
ally approaching the slope of the non-informational optimum
(β). Stronger female preferences (increasing λ) and/or smaller
costs for departing from the non-informational optimum (in-
creasing σ) cause greater exaggeration of the signalling trait.
Result 2. The extent of costly signal exaggeration will depend
on the slope of the relationship between individual quality and
the non-informational optimum (Fig. 1B). A steeper slope
(higher β) causes less exaggeration of the signalling trait, and
a more shallow slope (lower β) causes more exaggeration.
This is because a steep slope means that a low-quality male
would pay a high fitness cost to have the same trait value
as a higher quality male. In other words, increasing β makes
it more costly for a low-quality male to fake a high-quality
signal, given that doing so requires a larger deviation from his
non-informational optimum. As a result, high-quality males
do not experience strong selection to distinguish themselves
from lower quality males (they do not need to “try so hard”
to stand out). In contrast, decreasing β makes it less costly for
low-quality males to fake a high-quality signal and therefore
selects for high-quality males that exaggerate their signals to
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distinguish themselves from lower quality rivals. As the slope
declines in our model (β approaches zero), exaggeration above
the non-informational optimum becomes greater and greater,
without bound, for all qualities above the minimum.
Discussion
We asked how biological signals will evolve from traits with a
non-informational optimum that increases with individual qual-
ity. The main predictions from our model are that: (1) signals will
honestly reflect signaler quality whenever there is a positive rela-
tionship between individual quality and the signalling trait’s non-
informational optimum; and (2) the slope of this relationship will
crucially affect how much signal exaggeration evolves. A steeper
relationship, where high-quality individuals produce much bigger
traits because they are favoured to do so through natural selection,
leads to a higher potential cost of faking a high-quality signal and
means that less exaggeration is needed to maintain honest sig-
nalling. In contrast, a more shallow relationship between individ-
ual quality and the non-informational optimum leads to a lower
potential cost of faking a high-quality signal and means that more
exaggeration is needed to keep signals informative. Hence, our
model suggests that signals can become highly exaggerated when
they start off as weak cues of individual quality but not when they
start off as strong cues of quality. More generally, the model pre-
dicts a natural continuum of adaptive signal exaggeration, from
cost-free cues to costly handicaps, all within the same theoretical
framework.
A SIMPLE MECHANISM FOR HONEST SIGNALLING
We found that, in our model, signalling is always honest at equi-
librium. Previous theory shows that for stable honest signaling,
the cost for a higher investment in signalling must be greater
for low-quality signallers than for high-quality signallers (e.g.,
Grafen 1990a; Lachmann et al. 2001; Bergstrom et al. 2002; Hol-
man 2012; Biernaskie et al. 2014), or the benefit must be greater
for high-quality signallers (e.g., Godfray 1991; Holman 2012).
To allow for these differential fitness returns, modellers usually
design cost/benefit functions that can vary with both signal in-
vestment and individual quality. In contrast, a greater differential
cost for low-quality signallers arises naturally in our model. This
is because a high-quality signal is always a larger deviation from
the non-informational optimum of a low-quality individual than
from the optimum of a higher quality individual. There has been
much interest in the various mechanisms that could lead to higher
signalling costs paid by lower quality signallers (reviewed by
Fraser 2012). However, it has not been widely appreciated that a
positive relationship between signaller quality and the signalling
trait’s non-informational optimum is all that is needed.
Type of signalling trait
Cue-like                                  Handicap
Relationship between 
individual quality and non-
informational optimum
Signalling costs paid at 
equilbrium
Low                                                 High
Amount of exaggeration at 
equilibrium
What maintains honesty? Too costly to fake a high-quality signal
Low                                                 High
Steep slope                      Shallow slope
(high )                                    (low ) 
Figure 2. A natural continuum of signal exaggeration, from cost-
free cues to costly handicaps.
HOW COSTLY IS HONEST SIGNALLING?
Our model extends Grafen’s (1990a) model of the handicap prin-
ciple, making it consistent with more recent updates to costly sig-
nalling theory. In particular, whereas Grafen’s model predicted
that honest signals were always costly at equilibrium, several
models have since shown that honest signals need not be costly
to remain honest (Hurd 1995; Lachmann et al. 2001; Bergstrom
et al. 2002; Számadó 2011; Holman 2012). Instead, these models
show that low-cost honest signalling can be stable as long as the
potential cost for faking a dishonest signal is sufficiently high
(or the potential benefit is sufficiently low). In our model, the
potential cost of dishonesty is greatest when the cost of deviat-
ing from the non-informational optimum is high (σ approaches
zero), and/or the non-informational optimum steeply increases
with quality (β is large). Under these conditions, the signalling
trait becomes arbitrarily close to the non-informational optimum,
and the signalling costs paid at equilibrium do indeed approach
zero.
We conclude that two seemingly distinct kinds of traits in sig-
nalling theory—costly handicaps and cost-free cues of individual
quality—fit naturally within a general theory of costly signalling.
Cues are typically classified as non-signalling traits because, by
definition, they have not evolved for the purpose of conveying
information to receivers (Maynard Smith and Harper 2004; Wild
et al. 2017). However, cues of quality do experience signalling
selection: they vary with signaller quality, receivers respond to
that variation, and receiver responses affect signaller fitness. Our
model predicts that a truly non-informational cue will exist if
there is no net fitness benefit of exaggerating the cue into a signal
of quality. As soon as there is any fitness benefit of exaggeration,
however—and assuming that genetic variation can arise—the cue
will evolve into a signal that ultimately fits somewhere along a
continuum of exaggeration (Fig. 2). At one end of the continuum
will be costly handicaps, and at the other end will be low-cost
signals that are effectively equivalent to a non-informational cue.
These signals will differ in the costs paid at equilibrium, but they
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will be honest for the same fundamental reason: that it is too
costly to fake a dishonest signal.
Other models with variation in the strength of costs or bene-
fits of dishonesty have made similar conclusions about a contin-
uum from low- to high-cost signals (Lachmann et al. 2001; Hol-
man 2012). In one example, Holman (2012) found that low-cost
signalling persists when low-quality individuals are constrained
to produce only a minimal signal (because, as in our model, high-
quality males would not need not distinguish themselves). Based
on this, Holman (2012) predicted a continuum from costly handi-
caps to low-cost “index” signals—where low-quality individuals
are unable to signal dishonestly, owing to a causal link between
quality and signal size (Maynard Smith and Harper 2004). We
have argued elsewhere that such causal links will be favoured by
natural selection in both cheap and costly signaling systems, as
a mechanism to avoid the cost of dishonesty (Biernaskie et al.
2014). Hence, in our view, index-like signaling could be found
anywhere along the continuum in Figure 2, and it is the continuum
from handicaps to cues that is particularly significant.
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our results suggest novel hypotheses for when and why signals
evolve to be highly exaggerated or not. For example, before being
used as a signal, barn swallow tail length might have had a strongly
positive relationship with male quality (large β), explaining why
barn swallow tails are not so obviously exaggerated for signalling
(Evans 1998; Rowe et al. 2001; Bro-Jørgensen et al. 2007). In
contrast, the extreme exaggeration of the peacock’s tail might
have started with a weak relationship between tail length and
male quality (small β) before being used as a signal. We note that
our model assumes that females have perfect perception of male
signaling traits, whereas females in the real world might make
more mistakes if the original trait was only weakly correlated with
male quality. If this makes female choice less likely to be favoured
than when male traits are strongly correlated with quality, then
costly handicap signals may have a smaller chance of evolving
than cheaper, cue-like signals.
In addition to insights about the origin of exaggerated signals,
our model makes predictions about the maintenance of present-
day signals. Hence, if the key parameters of our model (β, λ, and
σ) could be estimated from existing signaling systems, then it may
be possible to test the predictions—for example, that that species
with high β values, all else equal, will have less signal exaggera-
tion than species with low β values. The barn swallow experiments
of Bro-Jørgensen et al. (2007) show how it is possible to partition
the variation in observed signals into a non-informational com-
ponent and a signaling component, owing to female preferences.
This suggests that future studies may indeed test whether varia-
tion in the underlying, non-informational component of signaling
traits can explain variation in the extravagance of present-day
signals.
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Appendix I
GENERAL MODEL
Here, we analyze a general model that extends Grafen’s (1990a)
model of handicap signalling. We consider the scenario described
in the main text, where males signal their quality to females, and
we assume a “non-informational” optimal level of the signalling
trait that varies with individual quality, owing to natural selection
in a non-signalling context. To represent the new assumption here,
we use the standard notation of applying a numerical subscript
to a variable to indicate that a partial derivative will be taken
with respect to that variable. We suppose that male fitness w is
maximized when the signalling trait is at its non-informational
optimum, a = n(q), with fitness decreasing on both sides of the
optimum. Formally, we write this as
sign(w1(a, p, q)) = − sign(a − n(q)) (A1)
where w1 indicates that a partial derivative is taken with respect
to a (the first argument in the male fitness function). For example,
when the signalling trait is below the non-informational optimum
(a < n(q)), the derivative w1 is positive, meaning that selection
favours a larger trait value.
Our aim is to find an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) un-
der the new assumption. The first step is to take the first derivative
of male fitness with respect to the signalling trait, evaluated at a
candidate equilibrium (A∗(q), P∗(a)). At the candidate ESS, the
slope of this first-order fitness gradient must equal zero, for other-
wise a male of some quality could increase his fitness by slightly
increasing or decreasing a from A∗(q). Hence, for evolutionary
stability, we must have
w1(a, P
∗(a), q) + P∗′(a)w2(a, P∗(a), q) = 0, (A2)
where a = A(q) for all q.
The next step is to find a form for P∗ ʹ(a) that satisfies the
first-order condition above. Let amin be the male signalling trait
at the non-informational optimum for the lowest quality male, so
amin = n(qmin). Then the simplest form of P∗ ʹ(a) that reduces the
left-hand side of the equation to zero is
P∗(amin) = qmin (A3a)
P∗′(a) = −w1(a, P
∗(a), P∗(a))
w2(a, P∗(a), P∗(a))
. (A3b)
This solution assumes that females infer that a male with
minimal signal will have minimal quality. We replace q with P∗(a)
because we are pursuing an honest equilibrium, at which females
correctly perceive male quality (i.e., where p = q): formally,
the minimization of equation (1) by females ensures that, at any
separating equilibrium, q = P∗(A∗(q)).
Our strategy now is to find solutions to (A3) that are one-
to-one over some initial range, relying on our assumptions in the
main text of sufficient continuity and differentiability. If we have
a solution to (A3), then we can invert that solution for P∗ to find
A
∗ over the range of the solution. We then consider under what
circumstances that initial range will extend to qmax and so give
us an ESS.
We begin by showing that the monotonic section at the be-
ginning of P∗ must be increasing. The initial slope of P∗ is zero
because the numerator, w1(amin, p, qmin), is zero by equation (A1).
This implies that immediately above amin, the slope of P
∗(a) is
positive, as a increases while the third argument representing q is
P
∗(a), which has initially zero slope. This gives the slope of the
signalling trait against quality (i.e., A∗(q), the inverse of function
P
∗(a)) effectively an infinite value, so that a > n(q). This in turn
leads to a negative value for w1 by our assumption, and so P
∗(a)
also has a positive slope (at least initially), as they are inverse
functions. Thus, the slope of P∗(a) remains positive for at least
some interval of values above amin. We can therefore invert it,
over at least some interval of q above qmin, to obtain an at least
partial male signalling rule as
P∗(A∗(q)) = q, (A4)
where the male signalling rule is implicitly defined. The properties
of A∗ include that A∗(qmin) = n(qmin), the initial slope at qmin is
infinite, and the slope is everywhere positive.
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Is the solution general and unique?
Some earlier criticism of Grafen’s (1990a) model by Siller (1998)
would suggest that the solution to our model above may not be
fully general. First, Siller (1998) raised the question of whether
a signalling equilibrium is shown to exist. Taking account of
this criticism, we may say that the example presented above will
define a unique signalling equilibrium only under some further
assumptions. If the cost of signalling rises too quickly (i.e., the
derivative w1 becomes too large and negative) or the advantage of
being perceived of higher quality is not very great (w2 is positive
but close to zero), then P∗(a) may tend toward infinity at a finite
level of a, say â. This case means we have no definition of P∗(a)
after a = â. Yet this still gives us a signalling level for each q, and
so the signalling equilibrium exists.
It is also possible that, although P∗ʹ(a) goes to infinity be-
cause – w1/w2 does, P
∗(a) itself reaches a finite value, q̂ , as P∗ʹ(a)
reaches infinity. Here the question is whether q̂ > qmax, in which
case the inversion of the function will still work and the candidate
signalling equilibrium assigns a signalling strategy to males of all
qualities; alternatively, q̂ < qmax, in which case the candidate sig-
nalling equilibrium does not assign a signal value to a range of the
highest quality males. The latter case is similar to the problematic
case where the cost of signalling becomes very low (w1 though
remaining negative becomes very small) or the advantage of being
perceived as of high quality becomes very great (w2 becomes very
large). A similar situation arises if there is a maximum signal level
amax, and the quality of males assigned by P
∗(amax) is less than
qmax. In these cases, a range of the highest quality males are not
assigned a signal by our candidate equilibrium. From a biological
point of view, this destroys the equilibrium, because that range of
high quality males must have some signal level, and they will alter
the appropriate response by females to males playing any of those
signal levels. There is a natural biological interpretation of these
cases. The signalling equilibrium depends on the cost of faking
a dishonest signal. If the cost is not great enough, or runs out by
the maximum possible signal level, then the signalling trait is just
not costly enough to be stably informative about the particular
quality.
A second criticism from Siller (1998) concerned uniqueness.
When a differential equation assigns an infinite value to a slope
at some value of the abscissa, it is generically the case that there
are multiple solutions. This might arise if w2 became zero, or if
w1 became infinite, at some point. This is important to consider in
applications, though often, as in our specific model (Appendix II
and main text), these situations will not arise.
Given our assumption in this study that male trait expression
is under natural selection to increase with male quality, there is
a new way that the candidate solution P∗ might not provide an
equilibrium. This can occur if at some higher quality, the signal
again equals the non-informational trait level for that quality. This
would be an opportunity for the lines to cross, leading to a zone
in which the sign of w1 becomes positive. Such a zone would
destroy a separating equilibrium by reversing the direction of P∗
so that more than one quality of male produced the same signal.
This recrossing of the lines is made less likely when we realize
that as the lines approach each other, a becomes close to n(q),
and so w1 approaches zero. This tends to make P
∗(a) decrease to
zero. Mathematical assumptions that would prevent this situation
are that w2/w1 and nʹ(q) are bounded for p, q  [qmin, qmax].
Appendix II
SPECIFIC MODEL
Here, we use the general method from Appendix I to solve a more
specific model, defined by the male fitness function in equations
(3) and (4) in the main text. We first find that the evolutionarily
stable female inference rule is given by
P∗(a) = qmin + a − amin
β
− λσ
2
β2
(
1 − exp
(
−(a − amin) β
λσ2
))
. (A5)
The first two terms in this equation would give the qual-
ity of a male for whom a is the non-informational optimum.
The third term therefore represents the “quality-gap” for a given
signalling level between the quality that would produce it non-
informationally and the quality that produces it under signalling.
It will be seen that this gap begins at zero, corresponding to P∗
(amin) = qmin, and then approaches exponentially an asymptote of
λσ2/β2 as a increases, with a half-life of (λσ2/β) ln (2) (i.e., the
distance on the a axis for the quality gap to halve). It is natural that
the gap is negative, as this shows a given signal is expressed by
a lower quality male under the signalling equilibrium than under
the non-informational optimum.
In contrast to the female preference strategy (eq. (A5)), there
is no simple expression for the male signalling strategy A∗. How-
ever, we may use the simple geometry of parallel lines to infer that
A
∗ equals the non-informational level of the signalling trait plus
a positive “signalling-gap”–the amount by which the male trait
is exaggerated from its non-informational optimum by signalling
selection. The signalling gap begins at zero and asymptotically
becomes λσ2/β, with a half-life of (λσ2/β2) ln (2).
Signalling costs at equilibrium
To evaluate signalling costs paid at equilibrium, we measure costs
as the amount by which a male trait is increased from its natu-
rally selected optimum through signalling selection, for a given
male quality, scaled by the costs of deviating from the naturally
selected optimum. Formally, we denote the signalling costs, x(q),
as follows:
x(q)= A
∗(q)−n(q)
σ
= λσ
β
exp
(
−(A∗(q) − amin) β
λσ2
)
, (A6)
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which captures the signalling and quality elements of male fitness
(note that the second term in the male fitness function, eq. (3) in
the main text, can be expressed as exp(– x(q)2/2)). A value of zero
for x(q) means no cost (zero signalling costs), whereas as x(q)
approaches infinity, fitness goes down to zero (suicidal signalling
costs).
Taking derivatives shows how signalling costs change with
the key parameters β, λ, and σ. Increasing β reduces signalling
costs toward zero, whereas taking β toward zero increases them
to suicidal levels (except for the fixed value A∗(qmin) = amin with
deviate equal to zero). Increasing λ increases signalling costs, as
it is worth paying higher costs for higher benefits, and equally
taking it down to zero reduces signalling costs toward zero.
Changes in the fitness penalty for deviating from the optimum
(changing σ) has a more complicated effect. As σ approaches
zero, signalling costs become zero. As σ increases from zero,
the initial slope of x(q) is high and reduces as σ increases. We
have already seen that signalling costs approach an asymptote,
and we learn now that the asymptote is low for low σ and in-
creases as σ increases. Thus, for any two values of σ, signalling
costs begin with higher values for the lower value of σ, but
there is a single crossing point after which signalling costs are
higher for the higher value of σ as they approach the asymptote
of λσ/β.
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